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ONE OF THE MORE INTEREST-
ING CASES I WORKED ON AS 
A YOUNG ASSOCIATE IN THE 
EARLY 1980S INVOLVED GEORGE 
STEINBRENNER, the well-known 
owner of the New York Yankees. He 
had invested in an oil and gas venture 
in West Virginia aptly named Yankee 
Energy. When the investment did not 
pan out, he filed suit against a wide 
array of defendants, including the West 
Virginia driller, the tax accountant who 
had worked on the deal, the attorney 
who had put together the invest-
ment documents, as well as his own 
personal financial advisor and assistant. 
Steinbrenner claimed that the defen-
dants had received improper kickbacks 
and had taken other actions that were 
fraudulent. 
The case became one of those 
scorched-earth lawsuits that have given 
U.S. litigation a bad name. Scores 
of depositions — some consisting of 
more discussion and argument among 
the lawyers than questions asked of 
deponents — were taken around the 
country, with most going for days if not 
longer. At one point, there were over 
100 discovery motions pending before 
the district court. 
In the middle of this procedural 
morass, one of the defendants filed a 
motion pursuant to Section 1407 to 
consolidate the Steinbrenner case and 
a handful of similar lawsuits involv-
ing other plaintiffs who had invested 
with the same West Virginia oil and 
gas driller. This was my first involve-
ment with the multidistrict litigation 
(MDL) process. It was not something 
that was taught in either the basic Civil 
Procedure or advanced Civil Procedure 
courses that I had taken in law school.
My initial reaction was that these 
cases probably were not the type of 
complex, large-claim cases that surely 
must make up the bulk of the MDL 
docket. But in researching the MDL 
process — which at that point had 
only been around for a dozen years — I 
was surprised that many of the MDL 
dockets were in fact consolidations of a 
relatively small number of cases. Indeed 
the origins of the MDL process did not 
define with any exactness the type of 
cases that could be found suitable for 
the process. While there were some 
general categories of case types that 
were identified as particularly appro-
priate, the MDL procedure was open-
ended and could be applied widely 
across the litigation spectrum. 
We opposed the motion to consoli-
date, generally arguing that there were 
too few cases to benefit from consolida-
tion and that the cases had significant 
factual variations. Also, our case was 
already in the later stages of discovery 
at the time of the Section 1407 filing. 
The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation (JPML) held a hearing on the 
case in Seattle. Several attorneys from 
Atlanta, Florida, and West Virginia 
made the long trek to Seattle for a very 
short 15-minute hearing. My opening 
comment made some reference to the 
Boston Red Sox not being forced to 
move a game in the top of the seventh 
inning (one of the panel judges was 
from Massachusetts so it seemed appro-
priate in a case involving the Yankees). 
The panel ultimately denied the motion 
to consolidate. We continued to slog 
through the trench warfare of discovery 
until ultimately the case was settled 
on the eve of trial. In retrospect, I still 
wonder whether MDL consolidation 
might have offered some benefits. 
The experience demonstrated to me 
— as it probably did to many litigators 
during this time period — the poten-
tial importance of the MDL process. 
If the Steinbrenner case had been 
transferred, it could have significantly 
impacted the handling of the case. A 
new transferee judge could have estab-
lished a new approach to discovery that 
could have radically altered the dynam-
ics of the case.
That the MDL process has grown 
and evolved since those early days 
is clear. The question is how it has 
evolved. Is it still a general procedure 
applicable across a wide range of liti-
gation case types? Or are there partic-
ular litigation types that have come to 
dominate the process as the currents of 
litigation have changed over time?
This question is of particular impor-
tance in the area of mass torts — those 
personal-injury claims that can involve 
hundreds or even thousands of victims 
of a single alleged wrong. 
The conventional wisdom is that 
the MDL process is generally applica-
ble to a wide range of litigation types, 
and that mass torts can be included as 
“one among many” types of lawsuits 
potentially subject to the MDL process. 
While one can view the MDL case 
statistics to support that view, a more 
careful examination of the MDL data 
as it now stands reveals a very different 
reality: Mass-tort claims have come 
to dominate the MDL docket. This 
growing trend raises questions as to 
how mass torts are shaped, defined, and 
ultimately resolved through the MDL 
process. Given the enormous poten-
tial liability associated with mass-tort 
claims, understanding the procedural 
processing of these claims is both inter-
esting and important. 
Historical Overview 
It is useful to provide a quick overview 
of the origins of the MDL process focus-
ing on the types of cases its proponents 
envisioned as being particularly suitable 
to its approach. 
The MDL arose out of judicial expe-
rience with an extraordinary number 
of antitrust cases filed by utilities, 
municipalities, and others against the 
manufacturers of electronic equipment. 
Following a successful government 
antitrust prosecution of manufacturers 
of electrical equipment in the 1960s, 
over 1,800 civil cases were filed in over 
30 different federal court districts. The 
discovery in those cases was exten-
sive, and the potential for overlapping 
depositions and document production 
was obvious. To deal with this “wave of 
litigation [that] threatened to engulf 
the courts,” the Judicial Conference 
of the United States recommended 
the creation of a new “Coordinating 
Committee for Multiple Litigation” 
to recommend actions to control and 
manage the cases.1    
The Coordinating Committee 
recommended a series of uniform 
pretrial and discovery orders that each 
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district court judge could apply to 
the cases in their respective districts. 
The uniform orders established rules 
for centralized document deposito-
ries. These depositories made nearly 
1 million documents available to the 
parties. The coordinating efforts also 
established the taking of “national” 
depositions in which attorneys from 
other cases could ask questions. 
The consensus view was that the 
actions taken by the Coordinating 
Committee were greatly successful 
in preventing the federal courts from 
being overwhelmed by the electrical 
equipment cases. By the same token, 
many recognized that the coordinating 
process itself had some inefficiencies, 
as over 30 district court judges had 
to arrange schedules and travel. Also, 
because the efforts were voluntary, there 
was the risk that in similar future cases, 
some judges would not fully cooperate. 
Accordingly, the Coordinating 
Committee drafted legislation to 
formalize a procedural tool to deal with 
situations that might arise. As a result of 
the recommendation, Congress in 1968 
established the JPML and empowered 
it to transfer groups of cases and assign 
them to a judge for the “limited purpose 
of conducting pretrial proceedings.” In 
discussing what was encompassed in 
this charge, the House report noted that 
pretrial proceedings “generally involve 
deposition and discovery” but that 
under the federal rules additional steps 
would be possible, including rendering 
summary judgment, controlling and 
limiting pretrial proceedings, and impos-
ing sanctions for “failure to make discov-
ery or comply with pre-trial orders.”2  
After completion of the pretrial proceed-
ings, the cases were to be remanded to 
the district where they were originally 
filed. There was never any expectation 
that the transferee judge would actively 
manage the case to consider a global 
settlement, although it was understood 
that some settlements may occur, such 
as in cases where liability was clear. The 
main focus for the transferee judge was 
to oversee the discovery process with 
the expectation that the cases would 
ultimately be remanded for trial. 
Having only had the electrical 
equipment “massive filings” as an 
example to justify the new procedure, 
it is interesting to consider what other 
areas of litigation might have been 
anticipated as especially likely to be 
subject to the new process at the time 
of the passage of the MDL procedures. 
The legislative history set forth the 
following as potential candidates for 
MDL treatment: 
“The types of cases in which massive 
filings of multidistrict litigation are 
reasonably certain to occur include not 
only civil antitrust actions but also, 
common disaster (air crash) actions, 
patent and trademark suits, products 
liability actions and securities law viola-
tion actions, among others.” 3 
Given the scant history of similar 
types of “massive filing” cases, this 
description has a bit of an “I know 
when I see it” feel to it. The electrical 
equipment cases had revealed a potential 
problem, and a simple solution had been 
found. It is probably not fair to assert 
that the MDL procedures were created 
as a prophylactic measure only for the 
extraordinary cases like the electrical 
equipment cases, but it was anticipated 
to be the exception rather than the rule. 
Knowing what we now know of 
the MDL process, it is surprising that 
the description used for eligible cases 
was “massive filings” — as if the MDL 
process would be reserved for a rela-
tively small number of actions that 
fit the model of the electrical equip-
ment cases. As the history of the MDL 
process shows, this focus on “massive 
filings” has been significantly relaxed.
It is less surprising that the focus of 
the anticipated use of the MDL process 
was not more clearly centered on what 
we have come to refer to as mass-tort 
cases. When enacted in 1968, the 
category of mass-tort cases was not well 
understood. Of course, this was well 
prior to the Agent Orange, Dalkon 
Shield, and Bendectin litigations that 
helped develop our appreciation for the 
potential of mass-tort claims. In the 
litigation world at the time, tort claims 
that could potentially be suitable for 
the new MDL process were imagined as 
primarily “common disasters,” such as 
airplane crashes, and, to a more limited 
extent, product-liability cases. 
Early Experience with the MDL Process
The MDL process quickly revealed that 
it was not going to be limited to excep-
tional cases with “massive filings.” An 
early study published in 1974 in the 
Harvard Law Review detailed extensive 
use of Section 1407.4 At the time of 
the study, the panel had considered 
148 actions under Section 1407 and 
consolidated actions in 112 dockets for 
a grant rate of 75 percent. As probably 
anticipated, antitrust was the leading 
area with 35 consolidations (31 percent 
of the total dockets granted). Securities 
cases —  which interestingly was not 
a category listed in the House report  
— constituted 28 of the total dockets 
created (25 percent). “Mass disasters” 
(which were primarily airplane crash 
cases) also constituted 28 of the dockets 
that were transferred. The only other 
category with a significant number of 
MDL dockets created was patent/copy-
right cases (11 dockets constituting 10 
percent of the total dockets granted). 
Significantly, product-liability 
cases — the category in which most of 
the mass-tort cases would fall in our 
current understanding of mass torts — 
were negligible. The panel considered 
only three potential product-liability 
dockets during the first six years of its 
operations; it denied transfer in two of 
the three matters. 
 One of those three early MDL 
product-liability cases is particularly 
interesting in the evolution of the 
It is surprising that the 
description used for eligi-
ble cases was “massive 
filings” — as if the 
MDL process would be 
reserved for a relatively 
small number of actions.
“
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use of the MDL process for mass-tort 
cases. In In re Oral Contraceptives Products 
Liability Litigation,5 the JPML consid-
ered the possible consolidation of 20 
different actions filed in 10 different 
districts based upon alleged injuries 
resulting from oral contraceptives 
manufactured by defendant G.D. Searle 
& Company. After citing the legislative 
history expressly listing product-liabil-
ity cases among possible MDL candi-
dates, the panel noted the “existence 
of several groups of product-liability 
litigation during the past two years.” 
Having become aware of the multiple 
claims against G.D. Searle, the panel 
itself initiated the MDL proceedings by 
entering an order directing the parties 
to show cause why the cases should not 
be transferred for consolidated pretrial 
proceedings. Ordinarily, this number 
and dispersion of cases would have 
justified consolidation, based upon the 
Harvard Law Review study. In response 
to the panel’s show-cause order, 
however, the parties stated that there 
were few if any common questions of 
law or fact and that the transfer of the 
cases would not serve the convenience 
of the parties or witnesses. The panel 
refused to transfer.
One can read the panel’s decision in 
In re Oral Contraceptives in one of two 
ways. By its action, as well as the lack 
of other product-liability cases at the 
time, the panel could be seen as having 
doubts as to whether mass-tort cases 
were appropriate for consolidation 
under Section 1407. The other reading 
— probably the more likely given the 
radical increase over time of precisely 
these sorts of mass-tort claims being 
consolidated — is that the panel was 
expressing its opinion that this was an 
area where MDL consolidation should 
be expanded. The opinion goes out of 
its way to make the point that the panel 
was aware of the existence of these types 
of product-liability cases. It also made 
clear that its decision to deny transfer 
was a function of the views expressed by 
the parties and was without prejudice to 
reconsidering the issue at a later time.6 
The main gist of the Harvard Law 
Review study was that the panel was 
aggressively using Section 1407. The 
panel had expressed a strong preference 
for consolidation even in cases in which 
there were noncommon facts or a small 
number of actions. As long as there 
were significant common issues, the 
panel was likely to grant consolidation. 
For example, with respect to air disaster 
litigation — the primary type of mass 
tort generally recognized at the time 
— consolidation was routinely granted 
unless discovery in the actions was  
close to completion.7 The panel, driven 
by its charge for achieving judicial  
efficiency, liberally granted consolida-
tion under Section 1407 sometimes 
even in the face of objections by the 
parties to the litigation. 
Rather than set a high threshold for 
the number of filings needed to justify 
consolidation, the study found that the 
panel regularly ordered consolidation 
if there were more than five actions 
involved (a far cry from the described 
justification of “massive filings”). The 
In Re Oral Contraceptives decision was 
one of only two cases involving more 
than five actions where transfer was 
denied based upon a finding of an 
absence of common facts. 
The study also noted that from the 
beginning of the MDL process, trans-
feree judges as well as the panel itself 
demonstrated an interest in resolving 
the cases as opposed to remanding them 
to the districts in which they were origi-
nally filed. Only some of the resolutions 
were expressly based upon existing 
pretrial procedures. On occasion, for 
example, transferee judges granted 
motions to dismiss or motions for 
summary judgment (pretrial procedures 
that were clearly within the purview of 
pretrial procedures that the transferee 
judge was expected to utilize). But 
use of such motions was usually only 
to “simplify litigation by eliminating 
certain issues or cases and only rarely to 
dispose of an entire group of cases.” The 
study noted only a single instance when 
a transferee judge had granted summary 
judgment on the basic common issue at 
the end of pretrial.8  
While there was nothing controver-
sial about the use of existing pretrial 
motions, transferee judges  — with the 
support of the panel  — also took other 
steps to avoid remanding. Most notable 
was the use of Section 1404(a), by 
which some judges entered orders trans-
ferring cases to their districts for the 
purpose of trying the case and imposing 
final judgment. While the practice 
of retaining cases for trial rather than 
remanding to the transferor court was 
controversial, there was substantial 
support for the practice based upon effi-
ciency considerations.9 Ultimately, the 
Supreme Court held that this approach 
was inconsistent with the plain mean-
ing of Section 1407, especially in light 
of the relevant legislative history.10 
The Harvard Law Review study also 
made clear that many MDL dock-
ets resulted in settlements achieved 
through the efforts of the transferee 
court. For example, in antitrust cases 
following a successful government pros-
ecution, the main issue was to deter-
mine damages as opposed to liability 
(which had already been established). In 
those cases, settlements were common 
without the need for remand. 
Evolution of the MDL Process
Since the early 1990s and the Harvard 
Law Review study, MDL practices have 
continued to evolve and gradually 
expand. An article published as part of 
a symposium on multidistrict litiga-
tion by Judge John Heyburn, chair 
of the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict 
Litigation between 2007 and 2014, 
provides an excellent overview of the 
state of MDL affairs as of 2008.11 As 
of that date, the panel had consid-
ered motions in nearly 2,000 dockets 
involving a quarter-million cases (likely 
involving millions of claims). 
The workload of the panel has 
gradually increased over time. In 1996, 
the panel for the first time considered 
more than 60 requests for consolida-
tion; in 2007, the panel considered 
almost 100 claims. As of 1997, there 
were 161 open MDL dockets encom-
passing 54,000 actions. Ten years later, 
the number of open MDL dockets had 
increased to 297, encompassing over 
76,000 pending actions.12 4
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In his analysis of the panel’s work-
load, Judge Heyburn made the special 
point to challenge the “common miscon-
ception” that the MDLs are mostly 
“mega-cases.” He noted that there were 
indeed some “mega-cases” in the MDL 
process, but that the large majority 
of MDLs did not fit that description.13 
As of 2008, only 37 out of about 300 
active MDLs comprised more than 100 
constituent actions, while only 10 had 
more than 1,000. He referenced three 
mass-tort cases dealing with asbesto-
sis claims (42,000 pending actions at 
the time), Vioxx claims (9,300 pending 
actions in which the judge had recently 
approved a settlement), and Seroquel 
claims (5,600 pending claims). In 
contrast, he noted that about half of all 
MDLs had 10 or fewer actions. Judge 
Heyburn reiterated the commonly made 
point that MDL dockets encompassed a 
wide variety of litigation categories. 
He did point out that recent develop-
ments limiting the use of class actions in 
mass litigation perhaps created the possi-
bility of greater use of MDL procedures 
for such claims. As class-action devices 
became less available or desirable, “some 
litigants may be turning to the MDL 
processes as a way of achieving some 
of the benefits or advantages formerly 
available under Rule 23.”14 This predic-
tion proved to be on the money as one 
looks to the present composition of MDL 
dockets, which have come to be domi-
nated by mass-tort cases. 
Contemporary MDL Proceedings and 
the Ascendancy of Mass Torts
In looking at the most recent six years 
of MDL activity following the overview 
described by Judge Heyburn, MDL 
activity at first glance seems to have 
reached a plateau. The high-water mark 
for MDL docket requests occurred 
in 2009, when for the first time, the 
number of requests topped the century 
mark with 121 new docket requests. 
After a dip in 2010 (84 new docket 
requests), it again surpassed 100 new 
dockets in 2011. In the following three 
years, new docket requests have been 
stable, averaging about 90 requests per 
year (which is essentially at the same 
level as the last few years documented 
by Judge Heyburn).15
More noteworthy, however, is that 
significantly fewer new MDL docket 
requests have been granted recently, 
with a corresponding increase in denials 
of MDL status. While the number of 
new MDL dockets in 2009 (83 new 
dockets granted) almost equaled the 
record 85 docket requests granted in 
2008, the number of new dockets has 
declined dramatically since then and 
is now at the levels of the early 2000s. 
From 2010 to 2014, a total of 241 
MDL docket requests were granted (on 
average 48 per year). During that same 
period, the denial rate for MDL dockets 
increased, as a total 160 MDL docket 
requests were denied (averaging 32 per 
year). The overall grant rate during 
this period was a historically low 60 
percent. By way of comparison, for 
the previous five-year period covering 
2005–2009, the panel granted MDL 
docket requests in 327 cases and denied 
requests in only 52 cases for a grant 
rate of 86 percent.
But what can be said about any 
changes in the type of cases subject to 
MDL treatment? For the past couple of 
years, annual statistics published by the 
JPML have shown the distribution of the 
types of cases for pending MDL dock-
ets. The data initially seems to confirm 
the conventional wisdom that the MDL 
process ranges broadly across many types 
of litigation, with a few areas of concen-
tration. The statistics focusing solely on 
the number of MDL dockets show that 
there are many types of cases that are 
subject to MDL treatment. But there 
is a flip side to this coin that tells a 
very different story if one focuses more 
on the number of pending actions that 
comprise those MDL dockets.
If one were to think about the faces 
carved on to an MDL Mt. Rushmore, 
it would certainly include antitrust 
and securities actions as long-standing 
major categories of litigation regularly 
achieving MDL status. The 64 antitrust 
dockets constitute close to 22 percent of 
the pending MDL dockets (a percentage 
markedly similar to what was found in 
the earliest Harvard Law Review study). 
Securities would be a lesser figure, but 
this category still constitutes a dura-
ble 10 percent of the MDL docket. 
Competing for a possible position would 
likely be sales practices (constituting 12 
percent of the dockets) or intellectual 
property cases (which has slipped to only 
6 percent of the MDL docket). 
The main nominees for the remain-
ing “monument” status would be prod-
ucts liability (with 70 MDL dockets or 
24 percent of the total) and the some-
what mysterious miscellaneous category 
with 49 dockets (17 percent of the 
total). Since the MDL statistics do not 
have a specific category for mass torts 
per se, if one were interested in assess-
ing the impact of MDL litigation on 
mass-tort claims, it would be necessary 
to examine whether the largest cate-
gory of cases — product liability — is 
comprised primarily of mass-tort cases 
or other types of product-liability cases. 
One might even reach a preliminary 
conclusion that there has been a decline 
of sorts as it relates to at least some 
categories of cases most often associ-
ated with mass tort. The number of air 
disaster and common disaster cases (two 
of the nine specific categories that the 
MDL statistics track) has shrunk to the 
bottom of the list, with only three and 
two MDL dockets respectively consti-
tuting a paltry 2 percent of pending 
dockets. These categories historically  
— especially during the early years of 
the MDL process — constituted a much 
more significant part of the workload. 
Mass Torts Dominate MDL Dockets
In drilling down into the current state 
of pending MDL dockets, it is possible 
to tell a very different story about the 
current state of MDL practice. Rather 
than being a process that is regularly 
used across a wide range of litigation 
types, it is in fact dominated by mass-
tort cases at a remarkable level. The 
JPML statistics that simply report an 
overview of the mere number of MDL 
dockets disguise that incredible concen-
tration of mass-tort actions through the 
MDL process. 
The primacy of mass-tort claims in 
the MDL process can be demonstrated 
by looking more carefully at the current 
cases. Using the JPML’s March 16, 
2015, report (most recent as of the time 
of the writing of this article), one can 
examine in detail the 287 MDL dockets 
to determine which dockets fall within 
the mass-tort category. The results 
are stunning: mass-tort MDL dockets 
consolidated over 125,000 civil actions 
constituting over 96 percent of all 
pending actions included in all of the 
MDL dockets. 
To develop a comprehensive list of 
mass-tort claims, one first includes 
the small number of dockets included 
in the air disaster and common disas-
ter categories. The three air disaster 
dockets involve relatively few pending 
actions. The common disaster category  
which includes the Deepwater Horizon 
MDL with 2,941 pending actions — 
has considerably more actions. 
It is then necessary to review the 
product-liability cases closely, as not all 
product-liability cases involve mass-
tort claims. A careful review of the 
product cases reveals that 16 of the 71 
product-liability MDLs are not mass-
tort claims. For example, nine of the 
MDL dockets involve claims against 
building supply companies whose 
products (windows, shingles, decking, 
or cement siding) were defective but 
were not alleged to have caused any 
personal injury.16 Three other MDL 
dockets involved product-liability 
claims based upon alleged defects in 
engines. There were four other MDL 
dockets alleging damage to products 
such as mold in washing machines, 
an herbicide that damaged trees, or 
products that contaminated well water 
(but not alleged to have caused any 
personal injury). In 
contrast to the mass-
tort product claims, 
the number of actions 
in these non-mass-
tort product claims 
was modest, with the 
exception of the Toyota 
Acceleration MDL 
Docket that included 
88 actions.17 Three 
other MDL dockets 
dealt with other types of property 
damage.18 Collectively, these 16 MDL 
dockets constituted only 561 pending 
civil actions. Only two of the dockets 
included more than 25 actions. The 
median number of actions per docket for 
these “non-mass-tort” product-liability 
cases was only 12 actions.   
The remaining 55 product-liability 
cases involve claims fairly described 
as mass-tort claims. These claims 
include numerous MDL dockets against 
suppliers of medical devices such as 
artificial hips, as well as claims against 
pharmaceutical companies for alleged 
injuries resulting from drugs. Overall, 
these 55 MD mass-tort product-liabil-
ity dockets consolidated nearly 120,000 
pending civil actions. While 20 of the 
cases currently involve fewer than 100 
current consolidated actions (proba-
bly because the matters are in the last 
stages of resolution), most have histor-
ically involved hundreds and indeed 
usually thousands of actions. The 
historical total of actions consolidated 
in these 55 product-liability cases is 
over 390,000 actions.19
To determine the full range of mass-
tort MDL dockets, it is also necessary 
to peruse the miscellaneous category. 
It contains some of the new types of 
litigation that are constantly develop-
ing within the U.S. litigation system. 
For example, the pending list includes 
a number of dockets involving claims 
against companies such as Target and 
Sony for damages related to security 
breaches. The category also includes 
a variety of claims based upon unfair 
business practices relating to mort-
gages. But the MDL miscellaneous 
category also includes a number of 
mass-tort claims, such as the high- 
profile National Football League 
concussion cases (and similar claims 
filed against the National Hockey 
League and the National Collegiate 
Athletic Association). Overall there are 
seven MDL dockets in the miscella-
neous category that are fairly character-
ized as mass-tort claims. They include a 
total of 2,558 pending civil actions. 
MDL Mass-Tort Docket Statistics
Table 1 (at left) is a summary of the 
current  MDL dockets composed of 
cases from four different categories:  
(1) common disaster; (2) air disaster; 
(3) those product-liability dockets 
that involve mass-tort claims; and 
(4) those miscellaneous dockets that 
involve mass-tort claims. The results 
are, again, stunning: There are a total 
of 67 MDL mass-tort dockets (23 
percent of the total MDL dockets). 
Numerically, this is the largest cate-
gory of MDL dockets (with a few more 
dockets than in the antitrust category). 
But the true MDL dominance of mass 
torts is revealed when one examines the 
number of pending actions contained in 
those dockets. Those 67 MDL dockets 
include almost 125,000 pending civil 
actions. In comparison, the remaining 
non-mass-tort MDL dockets account for 
only about 6,000 pending cases. Thus, 
the mass-tort MDL dockets comprise 
an amazing 96 percent of the actual 
actions covered by MDL consolidations. 
In stark contrast to the non-mass-tort 
product claims or other MDL dockets 
that typically have relatively few claims, 
there are numerous mass-tort MDL 
claims with huge numbers of consoli-
dated actions. Table 2 (next page) is a 
list of the 23 MDL mass-tort dockets 
as of March 16, 2015, that include over 
1,000 pending civil actions. 
The incredible concentration of 
MDL pending actions in several large 
mass-torts cases represents an import-
ant trend. According to statistics 
published by the Center for Judicial 
Studies at Duke Law School, prior to 
2004, there were only a couple of large 
MDL dockets (defined as including 
more than 1,000 pending actions) 
TABLE 1
MASS-TORT MDL DOCKETS (as of March 16, 2015) 
CATEGORY     # of MDL Dockets  Pending Actions   Historical Actions
Common Disaster 2 2,964 3,111
Air Disaster 3  29 108
Miscellaneous 7 2,558 2,636
Product Liability 55 119,667 393,209
(Mass Tort only)    
TOTAL: 67 125,218 399,064
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outside of the asbestos cases.20 Thus, 
for the years 1999-2003, there were 
only one or two non-asbestos “large” 
MDL dockets that included on aver-
age a total of about 3,800 pending 
actions consolidated through the MDL 
process. These few MDL dockets had 
only about 9 percent on average of the 
total MDL pending actions. In the last 
ten years, the concentration of the large 
MDL cases — virtually all of which are 
mass-tort cases — has risen exponen-
tially. Thus, the same statistics from 
the Center for Judicial Studies show 
that for the years 2011–2014, there 
were on average 15 large MDL dockets 
with more than 1,000 pending actions 
and that those MDL dockets were, on 
average during this period, composed 
of nearly 65,000 pending actions 
(representing nearly 
75 percent of the MDL 
pending actions during 
this time period). The 
above analysis for the 
most recent information 
shows that the ascen-
dency and concentration 
of “large” MDL mass-
tort documents have 
continued and indeed 
accelerated.
Nor has the recent 
increase in MDL denials 
mitigated the growth 
in mass-tort dockets. 
With a few minor 
exceptions, the denials 
have occurred in patent 
or consumer cases 
involving relatively 
few potential cases to 
consolidate. For exam-
ple, from Oct. 1, 2013, 
through Sept. 30, 2014, 
the panel denied consol-
idation in 27 dockets.21 
The vast majority of 
denials came in nontort 
areas such as labor and 
employment disputes, 
patent cases, or nontort 
product-liability cases. 
Only three of dock-
ets involved claims 
that could be considered as potential 
mass torts. Each of the dockets was 
comprised of a small number of cases 
(averaging nine cases per docket), and 
presented unusual facts. For example, 
in one of the denied dockets involving 
the Mirena intrauterine device (IUD), 
the panel refused consolidation of nine 
cases filed by the same attorney that 
claimed neurological injuries distinct 
from the type of injury commonly 
alleged in an existing MDL docket. 
None of the MDL denials was in a 
docket with more than ten cases alleg-
ing tort claims. 
It may well be that growth in mass- 
tort MDLs is perfectly consistent with 
the origins of the MDL process. Many 
of the mass-tort claims present the 
type of “massive-filing” cases that gave 
rise to the initial MDL legislation. 
Handling cases with literally thousands 
of claims indeed raises the specter of 
overburdened courts grappling with 
massive, duplicative discovery proceed-
ings. So, even though Congress had not 
specifically anticipated the onslaught of 
mass-tort cases in its present form, the 
MDL process is arguably well suited to 
the development. 
But what is also clear is that the 
MDL process has important implica-
tions for how cases are managed. What 
was initially designed as a simple 
procedure for coordinating discovery is 
obviously much more than that today. 
As Judge Alex Kozinski wrote in his 
dissent to the Ninth Circuit’s deci-
sion in Lexicon, “[t]he simple reality 
is that once a case is sucked into the 
MDL vortex, it seldom comes back.”22 
While the Supreme Court has limited 
what Kozinski called the federal court’s 
“remarkable power grab” by limiting 
the use of transferee courts transferring 
actions to their own courts, the fact 
remains that the vast majority of cases 
transferred through the MDL are never 
remanded back to where they were 
filed. Instead, the cases are most often 
resolved through settlement as part of 
the MDL proceedings. 
It is impossible to view the MDL 
process as a neutral procedure designed 
simply to achieve discovery efficien-
cies.23 From the beginning, the MDL 
process did more than that. The 
development represents more than a 
simple “power grab” by some transferee 
judges. It also reflects the evolution and 
expansion of what constitutes “pretrial” 
procedures since the time when Section 
1407 was enacted. Not only have discov-
ery practices radically evolved over time 
(requiring far more judicial supervision 
controlling perceived discovery abuse as 
well as dealing with the development of 
e-discovery), but numerous other changes 
have radically redefined the role of the 
judge in managing the pretrial process. 
Consider just a few important 
changes that impact pretrial proce-
dures: The Supreme Court reinvigorated 
summary judgment in the 1980s and 
more recently refined how district courts 
TABLE 2
MASS-TORT PENDING MDL DOCKETS WITH 1,OOO OR MORE  
PENDING ACTIONS (as of March 16, 2015; all Product Liability unless noted)  
MDL # Short Name Pending Actions Historical Actions
2327 Ethicon, Inc. 23,569 24,220
2325 American Medical 19,093 19,600
2326	 Boston	Scientific	 15,429	 15,700
2187 C.R. Bard 10,525 10,823
2244 DePuy Orthopaedics  7,147 7,240
2197 DePuy Orthopaedics  6,819 9,395
2299 Actos (Pioglitazone)  4,130 4,286
2100 Yasmin 3,502 11,801
2179 Deepwater Horizon 2,941 3,083 (CD)
2428 Fresenius GranuFlo 2,925 2,926
2441 Stryker Hip Implant 2,316 2,387
2433 Du Pont C-8 (drinking water) 2,191 2,197 (Misc)
2502 Lipitor  2,079 2,082
2387 Coloplast Corp 1,870 2,011
2391 Biomet Hip Implant 1,863 2,458
1964 NuvaRing 1,739 1,863
2385 Pradaxa    1,647 2,597
  875 Asbestos 1,510  192,049
1871 Avandia 1,332 5,277
2434 Mirena IUD 1,212      1,234
2545 Testosterone Replacement 1,172 1,174
2272 Zimmer NexGen Knee 1,090 1,579
2308 Skechers Shoe  1,038 1,110
 
TOTAL:   23 CASES 117,139  327,092
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are to examine motions to dismiss. The 
Court also imposed important gate-
keeping obligations on the district court 
to review the reliability of opposing 
parties’ expert witnesses. The role of the 
judge in actively managing the settle-
ment process also has greatly evolved 
over this period. The use of court- 
ordered ADR was unheard of at the 
time of the enactment of Section 1407. 
The point is simply that what was 
initially thought of as the purpose of 
the MDL process — coordination of 
“depositions and discoveries” — is in 
fact much more than that. 
Conclusion
The conventional wisdom has long 
been that MDL has continually 
expanded since its inception and that it 
has come to play an important — and 
increasingly controversial — role in 
American litigation. It has never been 
limited to situations with “massive 
filings,” but rather was a procedural 
option that was utilized in a wide 
variety of litigation types, a bit of 
a “one-size-fits-all” approach that 
impacted many litigation contexts. 
The conventional wisdom needs to 
be refined. To be sure, there are several 
types of litigation that are subject to 
the MDL process that involve rela-
tively modest numbers of claims. The 
utilization of the MDL process in those 
contexts has remained stable, and may 
indeed be decreasing (or at least not 
expanding as it was in the past). The 
reality with respect to mass-tort claims 
is radically different. The MDL process 
has come to be dominated by large 
mass-tort dockets typically involv-
ing thousands of underlying actions. 
Indeed, over 95 percent of the total 
actions currently consolidated through 
the MDL process are mass-tort cases. 
This represents a significant evolution 
in the utilization of the MDL process 
that initially took a restrictive approach 
to the mass-tort context. 
Any hesitancy or concern with the 
appropriateness of MDL treatment is 
now certainly a relic of the past. The 
MDL process has indeed become a 
vortex with respect to mass torts. This 
is not necessarily a problem or wrong 
—  indeed it is arguably fully consis-
tent with original conceptualization 
of the MDL process. But given the 
reality that well over 100,000 mass-
tort actions are currently consolidated 
through the MDL process, it is import-
ant to examine carefully and critically 
how the MDL works. 
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